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ecent patterns in natural gas prices have raised
public concern about the pricing of natural
gas in U.S. markets (Johnson 1992). In recent
years, prices paid by industrial and electrical end
users have fallen more than wellhead prices,
while residential and commercial prices have
fallen less than wellhead prices (Yücel 1991).1
The lack of uniform changes in natural gas
prices may arise from differences in end users and
the market institutions that serve them. Industrial
and electrical users of natural gas can switch
easily between oil products and natural gas, while
residential and commercial users cannot. Industrial
and electrical users generally bypass local distri-
bution companies (LDCs), relying heavily on spot
supplies in a competitive market served by brokers
and pipeline companies. In contrast, residential
and commercial users typically purchase their gas
from LDCs, which earn a regulated rate of return
and obtain their supplies under long-term contracts.
These observations about U.S. natural gas
markets lead us to ask two questions. Do differing
characteristics in end users and the market institu-
tions serving them lead to differences in pricing
behavior? Are changes in natural gas prices uneven
in the long run, or is popular concern about natural
gas prices unwarranted? To answer these questions,
we examined econometrically how price shocks are
transmitted across various markets for natural gas.
Natural Gas Markets and Prices
As natural gas journeys downstream from the
wellhead, it travels through collection systems,
pipelines, and local distribution systems before it
reaches its consumers. Natural gas prices are
observed in six separate markets. Prices in these
markets include wellhead, city gate, and four end-
use prices. End-use prices are identified by the
characteristics of the final customer—that is, as
residential, commercial, industrial, and electrical
prices for natural gas.
Natural gas is first sold at the wellhead,
where it is produced. Both pipeline companies
and brokers use the collection and pipeline systems
to transport gas from the field to their customers,
with brokers using the pipelines as contract carriers.
Pipeline companies and brokers sell their natural
gas directly to some end users and to LDCs, which
pay the city gate price. In turn, the LDCs distribute
gas throughout localities and sell it to additional
end users.
When comparing end-use markets for natural
gas, several differences stand out. Industrial and
electrical users of natural gas generally can switch
easily between fuels to seek the lowest cost energy
source. As a consequence, most of these end users
rely heavily on spot supplies purchased directly
from pipeline companies and brokers. For the
most part, these suppliers seem to behave com-
petitively in serving this market (Brown and Yücel
1993). In contrast, most residential and commer-
cial consumers are tied to a single fuel. These end
users purchase their natural gas from LDCs, which
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earn a regulated rate of return and obtain much
of their gas under long-term contract. (For a dis-
cussion of why electrical and industrial end users
rely more heavily on spot markets for natural gas
than commercial and residential customers, see
the box titled “Development of a Spot Market for
Natural Gas.”)
To some extent, differing reliance on spot
and contract supplies may account for the long-
term difference in the way price shocks are trans-
mitted through the market for natural gas. When
average wellhead prices change, spot prices
generally change more than those specified in
long-term contracts. Thus, when average wellhead
prices fall, as has been the trend since 1985, spot
prices generally fall more than those specified in
long-term contracts.
The extent to which the supply in a market
comprises spot gas determines how responsive its
prices are to changes in the average wellhead
price. With a greater than average reliance on
spot supplies, electrical and industrial customers
stand to see a change in their gas prices that is
greater than the market average. With a less than
average reliance on spot supplies, commercial and
residential customers stand to see a change in
their gas prices that is less than the market average.
Empirical Analysis of Natural Gas Pricing
The institutional arrangements in natural gas
markets suggest that seven pairs of natural gas prices
have an upstream–downstream relationship. These
are the wellhead price with electrical, industrial,
city gate, commercial, and residential prices, and
the city gate price with commercial and residential
prices. For each pair of upstream and downstream
prices, we conceptualize the long-run relationship
as a simple markup model of natural gas prices in
which price shocks are transmitted:
() , 1 PD a PU tt =+ β
where PD is a downstream price for natural gas,
and PU is an upstream price for natural gas.
To examine how changes in price are trans-
mitted across the markets for natural gas, we
utilize time-series methods. In the absence of a
specific theory to be tested, we use the statistical
tests, together with identifying assumptions, to
assess in which markets shocks to natural gas
prices originate and how they are transmitted
across natural gas markets.
Our econometric work involves a number of
steps. We check whether the price series are
stationary and find that all of them have stochastic
trends (or are integrated). For each of the seven
pairs of prices, we then test for cointegration and
use a series of reduced-form vector-error-correction
models to test for causality and adjustment to
equilibrium error. We then identify the sources of
long-run price shocks and calculate their persis-
tence. Estimation and testing uses monthly data
from January 1984 through March 1992.2
Integration. As an initial step in our econometric
work, we check whether our price series are inte-
grated or stationary. A time series that is inte-
grated is said to have a stochastic trend (or unit
root). Identifying a series as an integrated, non-
stationary series means that any shock to the
series will have permanent effects on it. Unlike a
stationary series, which reverts to its mean after a
shock, an integrated time series does not revert to
its preshock level.
Applying conventional econometric techniques
to an integrated time series can give rise to mis-
leading results.3 Therefore, we use both augmented
Dickey–Fuller and Phillips–Perron tests to test for
2 During the estimation period, there were extensive changes
in federal regulation of the natural gas pipeline industry.
These changes raise concern about estimating stable rela-
tionships between the wellhead price and the electrical,
industrial, and city gate prices. Because we do find
cointegrating relationships in all cases, we treat the regula-
tory changes as primarily endogenous or irrelevant to the
transmission of price shocks.
Monthly data for average wellhead, city gate, electrical,
industrial, commercial, and residential prices were obtained
from the U.S. Department of Energy. The price series were
deflated with a monthly GNP deflator series and then
seasonally adjusted with the X–11 procedure in SAS.
The monthly GNP deflator was obtained by using the
Chow–Linn procedure on quarterly data. The consumer
price and producer price indexes were used as monthly
reference series in the Chow–Linn procedure.
3 See Balke (1991), Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990), and
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stochastic trends. We find that all price series are
integrated of order one—that is, the first differ-
ences of all series are stationary.4
Cointegration. After determining that each price
series is integrated of order one, we test each of
the seven pairs of natural gas prices described
above for cointegration. Two integrated time series
are cointegrated if they move together in the long
run. Cointegration implies a stationary long-run
relationship between the two series. As such, the
cointegrating term provides information about the
long-run relationship.
If cointegration is not accounted for, any
model involving the two cointegrated variables
could be misspecified, and/or the parameter esti-
mates could be inefficiently estimated.5 Therefore,
we employ the Johansen procedure to estimate
As consumers of large quantities of en-
ergy, industry and electrical utilities have found
it attractive to invest in the ability to switch
between residual fuel oil and natural gas. This
ability may have contributed to the develop-
ment of spot markets for natural gas. Without
the ability to switch fuels, an electrical or
industrial user would find it undesirable to rely
on spot supplies because the pipeline com-
pany or LDC providing connections to the
natural gas transportation and distribution
system could appropriate the end user’s capi-
tal investment.
Energy consumption involves relatively
high capital costs. After an end user makes a
capital investment that is specific to natural
gas consumption, the pipeline company or
LDC providing the connection could exploit
monopoly power over the end user’s capital
investment. Government regulation and long-
term supply contracts negotiated before the
investment is made are two ways to protect a
capital investment that has a specific use.
Competition among suppliers also protects
the energy user’s capital investment and al-
lows the user to rely on spot supplies (Ellig
and High 1992).
A spot market for natural gas may not
provide enough competition to protect the
capital investment of its end users.1 End users
Development of a Spot Market for Natural Gas
must still rely on a specific LDC or pipeline
company for a hookup to the natural gas
transportation and distribution system. The
ability to switch fuels provides end users with
competitive energy supplies, allowing them to
rely on spot supplies of natural gas.
In contrast, most commercial and resi-
dential customers find it too expensive to
invest in the ability to switch fuels, given their
relatively small consumption of energy. Their
low levels of consumption combined with their
inability to switch fuels reduces the attractive-
ness of relying heavily on spot supplies of
natural gas. In that sense, LDCs protect their
customers from potential upstream monopo-
lies by obtaining a greater share of their
natural gas supplies under long-term con-
tract. In turn, state governments regulate
LDCs, giving them a regulated rate of return
and preventing them from exercising mo-
nopoly power over their customers. Com-
bined with the regulators’ concern for security
of supply, however, this regulated rate of
return may induce LDCs to overcommit to
long-term contracts (Lyon 1990).
1 The spot market for gas creates a competitive demand for the
transportation and distribution of natural gas, protecting the
capital investments of the pipeline and LDCs involved in con-
tract carriage.
4 In other words, shocks to first differences of all series are not
permanent.
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the cointegrating relationship between pairs of
upstream and downstream prices.6 We find a linear
cointegrating relationship (of the form PD = βPU )
between all seven pairs of prices considered.
Because each estimated cointegrating relation-
ship is stationary, the cointegrating terms provide
an efficient estimate of the long-run relationships
between upstream and downstream prices. If a
one-unit change in the upstream price occurs over
the long run, it will be met by a β change in the
downstream price over the long run. Conversely,
if a one-unit change occurs in the downstream
price over the long run, it will be met by a 1/β
change in the upstream price.
As Table 1 shows, the estimated βs are un-
equal, signifying that a one-unit change in an up-
stream price affects some downstream prices more
than others. It is not possible, however, to directly
test whether the differences between the βs are
statistically significant. To assess whether the esti-
mated βs differ significantly from each other, we
use an indirect test for which we estimate cointegra-
ting relationships between all possible price pairs.
With these additional estimates, we judge which
βs are or are not equal to each other. For example,
to assess whether the β in the wellhead–electrical
price pair (βWE) is different from the β in the
wellhead–residential price pair (βWR), we estimate
a cointegrating relationship between the electrical–
residential price pair (βER) and check to see
whether it has a value equal to one. A value of
one for βER would imply βWE = βWR. A nonunitary
value would imply βWE  βWR.7
We find the βs between the wellhead price
and the electrical and industrial prices are the same
as each other but greater than the β between the
wellhead price and the city gate price. We also
find that the βs between the wellhead price and
the commercial and residential prices are equal to
each other but less than the βs between the well-
head price and the electrical and industrial prices.
At best, the estimated βs only partially sup-
port public concerns about uneven changes in
natural gas prices. Differences in the estimated βs
do show that uneven changes in natural gas prices
are maintained in the long run. Specifically, a per-
Table 1
Cointegration of Upstream and Downstream Prices
Price pairs Cointegrating Significance
Upstream Downstream relationship (β   1)
Wellhead Electrical 1.401 .002
Wellhead Industrial 1.453 .000
Wellhead City Gate 1.186 .000
Wellhead Commercial 1.294 .003
Wellhead Residential 1.148 .120
City Gate Commercial 1.079 .282
City Gate Residential .938 .447
6 The Johansen procedure is a maximum likelihood method.
We chose it over several other procedures because it
provides the most efficient estimates of the cointegrating
relationships. In addition, it provides estimates of the num-
ber of cointegrating relationships.
7 Let PE = βWEPW, PR = βWRPW, and PR = βERPE. Then PR = (βWR/
βWE)PE, and βER = βWR/βWE. It follows that a value of one for
βER implies βWE = βWR. A nonunitary value for βER implies
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manent change in the wellhead price is accompa-
nied by more extreme changes in the electrical
and industrial prices for natural gas than in the
commercial and residential prices for natural gas.
Nonetheless, our estimates suggest that the recent
pattern, in which residential and commercial prices
for natural gas have fallen less than the wellhead
price, is unlikely to persist. The βs between the
wellhead price and the commercial and residential
prices are estimated at greater than or equal to
one, indicating that residential and commercial
prices for natural gas change by at least as much
as the average wellhead price in the long run.
For the three pairs of prices involving well-
head price with electrical, industrial, and city gate
prices, the βs are greater than one. These βs
mean that the markups over the wellhead price
taken by the pipeline companies on electrical,
industrial, and city gate prices increase as natural
gas prices rise and decrease as natural gas prices
fall. These βs can be consistent with either normal
responses to shocks in demand, or shocks to
supply coupled with increasing returns to scale.
Because price shocks can arise from either
shocks to supply or demand, further interpretation
of the βs requires additional information. For
natural gas, demand shocks can originate in factors
such as changing oil prices, economic activity,
weather, technology, and government regulation of
energy consumption. Supply shocks can originate
in factors such as changing production technology,
geophysical knowledge, and government policy.
Using this information for the period of analysis,
we view changes in demand to be a more impor-
tant source of initial shocks to natural gas markets
than changes in supply (Brown and Yücel 1993).
Given our view, demand shocks account for long-
run movements in natural gas prices (see “Long-
Run Sources of Variance,” below).
As such, the estimated βs between the well-
head price and the electrical, industrial, and city
gate prices are consistent with a normal response
to shocks in end-use demand. As end-use demand
is increased, the pipeline companies experience
rising costs and/or are able to increase profits. As
end-use demand is decreased, the pipeline com-
panies experience falling costs and/or are forced
to reduce profits.
The likelihood of variable profitability is
consistent with the fact that pipeline companies
purchase more gas under long-term contract than
they sell under long-term contract. Given the exist-
ing contracts, prices at which pipelines sell natural
gas would vary more in the face of fluctuating
demand than the prices they pay for natural gas.
Data for the estimation period generally show
falling natural gas prices and declining profitability
for pipeline companies.8
The differences we see in the βs most likely
reflect how spot and contract prices respond to
changing market conditions. Spot prices adjust
more readily, and industrial users rely more heavily
on spot supplies than do LDCs. Differences in the
βs also may reflect a lack of incentive for LDCs to
pursue the cheapest sources of gas as prices are
falling because their rate of return is regulated,
and their customers cannot easily switch fuels.
The βs between the city gate price and the
commercial and residential prices for natural gas
are not significantly different from unity. These
estimates probably reflect a regulated rate of
return for LDCs and a direct pass-through of gas
price changes.
Causality. A causal relationship between two
variables implies that changes in one variable lead
to changes in the other. To test for a predictive
relationship between the variables, we perform
Granger causality tests on each of the seven pairs
of upstream and downstream prices.
Because all our price series are cointegrated,
we account for cointegration by specifying an
error-correction model in which changes in the
dependent variable are expressed as changes in
both the independent variable and dependent
variable, plus an error-correction term. For cointe-
grated variables, the error-correction term is the
deviations from the long-run cointegrating rela-
tionship between the variables. The coefficient on
the equilibrium error reflects the extent to which
8 An alternative explanation for declining pipeline profitability
is structural change. Since 1985, the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission has changed the role of pipelines toward
one of open access and contract carriage. These changes
helped foster the development of a spot market for natural
gas served by brokers and the pipeline companies. This
explanation is inconsistent with finding cointegration unless
one can view the structural change as endogenous to
market pressure brought to bear by falling demand.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 46
the dependent variable adjusts during a given
period to deviations from the cointegrating rela-
tionship that occurred in the previous period.9
The tests involve estimating a reduced-form
vector-error-correction model comprising the
following set of equations for each pair of prices:
() , 2
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where PU is the upstream price, PD is the down-
stream price for natural gas, CI is the errors in the
cointegrating relationship (PDt–βPUt),10 ai, bj, ci,
dj, α1, α2 are parameters to be estimated, and µ1t
and µ2t are white noise residuals.11 The coeffi-
cients α1 and α2 represent the adjustment to equi-
librium error.
Causality runs from the downstream price to
the upstream price if α1 and the ai jointly are
statistically different from zero. Similarly, causality
runs from the upstream price to the downstream
price if α2 and the ci are jointly statistically differ-ent
from zero. If both sets of coefficients are signifi-
cantly different from zero, causality is bidirectional.
As shown in Table 2, shocks in the well-
head, electrical, industrial, and city gate prices
cause shocks in all other prices with which they
are paired. If we abstract from shocks that might
be initiated by pipeline companies or LDCs, shocks
originating in electrical and industrial prices most
likely reflect changes in the prices of competing
fuels. Shocks originating in the city gate price may
reflect the LDCs’ response to quantity shocks in
their end-use markets. For any particular down-
stream price, shocks to the wellhead price may
reflect changes in drilling technology, changes in
reserve estimates, contracts fixed to oil prices, and
changes in demand by other downstream buyers.
Table 2
Causality and Adjustment to Equilibrium Error
(Significance)
Price Pairs Causality Adjusts to error*
Upstream Downstream PU to PD PD to PU PU PD
Wellhead Electrical .025 .000 .014 .542
Wellhead Industrial .007 .000 .001 .285
Wellhead City Gate .005 .000 .000 .783
Wellhead Commercial .000 .166 .082 .001
Wellhead Residential .002 .320 .155 .002
City Gate Commercial .000 .758 .457 .006
City Gate Residential .005 .600 .570 .011
*The significance of errors in the cointegrating relationship in the respective upstream and downstream price equations indicates
adjustment to the equilibrium error.
9 See Engle and Granger (1987).
10 The error-correction term is included because all pairs of
upstream and downstream prices are cointegrated with
each other.
11 The value of n was set in the Johansen procedure to assure
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Price shocks in commercial and residential
prices do not cause shocks in other prices. This
finding most likely reflects how LDCs administer
natural gas prices for commercial and residential
users. In response to changing weather, fluctuating
economic activity, or changing prices for compet-
ing fuels, the customers adjust their consumption
of natural gas.12 Changes in consumption prompt
LDCs to seek smaller supplies at lower prices or
greater supplies at higher prices. Only as the city
gate price paid by LDCs is changed, however, are
price changes passed on to end users.
Adjustment to Equilibrium Error. If two variables
are cointegrated, any movement away from the
long-run cointegrating relationship will eventually be
corrected, and the variables will move back into
their long-run relationship. The adjustment could be
through one or both of the variables. Which variable
adjusts to the equilibrium error depends on many
factors, including elasticities and market structure.
In a cointegrated system (such as represented
by equations 2 and 3), the presence of an error-
correction term implies that the dependent variable
adjusts to the equilibrium error. The coefficient on
the equilibrium error, α, reflects the extent to
which a given price variable reacts in the short
run to deviations from its long-run relationship
with another price variable. In the equations
where α is significant, the dependent variable
adjusts to deviations from the cointegrating rela-
tionship. In equations where α is not significant,
the dependent variable does not adjust to devia-
tions from the cointegrating relationship.
As shown in Table 2, the electrical and
industrial prices do not adjust to errors in their
equilibrium relationship with the wellhead price.
Instead, the wellhead price adjusts. These findings
are consistent with electrical and industrial demand
being more elastic in the short run than is the
supply of natural gas. A high short-run elasticity
of demand reflects these end users’ ability to
switch fuels.
Similarly, the wellhead price adjusts to errors
in its equilibrium relationship with the city gate
price, but the city gate price does not adjust. The
resistance of the city gate price may indicate some
ability of commercial and residential customers to
switch fuels, the ability of LDCs to foster competi-
tion between suppliers, or an inelastic supply of
gas at the wellhead.
From our institutional knowledge of the
natural gas market, we can make a compelling
case for a very inelastic supply of natural gas in
the short run. Producers hesitate to vary produc-
tion because doing so could disturb pressure in
the well, which could reduce its eventual output
or make production from it more costly.
The adjustment of commercial and residential
prices to errors in their equilibrium relationships
with upstream prices is consistent with adminis-
tered prices.
Impulse Response. To examine the dynamic
properties of shocks to the price variables, we
calculate impulse response functions. The impulse
response function traces the effects and persistence
of a shock on both the upstream and downstream
prices. The persistence of a shock tells us how
fast the system adjusts back to equilibrium. The
faster a shock dampens, the quicker the adjustment.
We use the Choleski decomposition to
calculate impulse response functions for each of
the seven reduced-form vector-error-correction
models.13 For each model, we analyze the effects
of a one-time, standard deviation shock to the first
difference of each price in the pair.14 We trace the
effects of this impulse on the equilibrium error
and the upstream and downstream prices.
We find that the maximum impact generally
occurs within one to three months of the shock.
12 Econometric evidence suggests that residential and com-
mercial natural gas consumption do respond to changes in
the prices of competing fuels (Bohi 1981). The response is
not through fuel switching in the existing energy-using
capital stock, however. The response comes through long-
term changes in the energy-using capital stock.
13 The Choleski decomposition decomposes the residuals µ1t
and µ2t into two sets of impulses that are orthogonal to each
other. Orthogonalization allows one to take covariance
between the residuals into account.
The Choleski decomposition imposes a recursive struc-
ture on the system in which the ordering of the dependent
variables is specified. If the covariance between the residu-
als is sufficiently high, the ordering can affect the results.
We experimented using both changes in the upstream
price and changes in the downstream prices first in the
ordering.
14 This implies a permanent shock to the price.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 48
In six cases, deviations from the long-run equilib-
rium relationship between the prices dampen
below 5 percent of their peak value within eight
to twenty-seven months after a shock, as shown
in Table 3.15
In four cases, shocks dampen in about one
and a half to two years. Deviations from the equi-
librium relationships between wellhead price and
commercial and residential prices appear to dampen
in less than a year. This quick dampening appears
somewhat anomalous given the slower adjustment
to equilibrium in the relationships between city
gate price and commercial and residential prices.
Nonetheless, the quick adjustment is reasonable
because in the long run, wellhead, commercial,
and residential prices adjust to shocks originating
in city gate prices.16
Long-Run Sources of Variance. To find out
which price shocks are the most likely sources of
variance, we use the Choleski decomposition to
calculate the variance decomposition. For given
time horizons, the variance decomposition appor-
tions the stochastic variability in a given price to
shocks in itself and the price with which it is
paired. Given our impulse response analysis, we
use sixty months to represent the long run.
As shown in Table 4, the calculated source of
variance is generally invariant to the ordering of
the variables in the Choleski decomposition.17 The
two models in which the wellhead price is matched
with electrical and industrial prices are an excep-
tion. If the change in wellhead price is placed
first, both shocks to the wellhead price and the
end-use prices are equal sources of variability. If
either the change in electrical or industrial prices
is placed first, shocks to the end-use price account
for more than 90 percent of the variance.
In these cases, we prefer the ordering in
which innovations in the end-use price are placed
first. This ordering presumes that shocks are most
likely to originate in the end-use prices, which fits
our view that changes in demand were a more
important source of shocks than changes in supply
Table 3
Impulse Responses in Upstream and Downstream Prices
(Based on Choleski decomposition)
Month in which shock dampens to 5 percent of maximum
Price Pairs ∆PU first shock to ∆PD first shock to
Upstream Downstream ∆PU ∆PD ∆PU ∆PD
Wellhead Electrical 8 19 16 20
Wellhead Industrial 19 16 17 17
Wellhead City Gate * * * *
Wellhead Commercial 11 11 11 9
Wellhead Residential 10 10 10 10
City Gate Commercial 24 26 24 27
City Gate Residential 14 16 15 16
*Shocks do not dampen.
15 In one case, the wellhead price-city gate price relationship,
the shocks did not dampen.
16 See “Long-Run Sources of Variance,” below.
17 See footnote 13.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 49
during our period of analysis (Brown and Yücel
1993). Shocks to demand may come from fluctua-
tions in economic activity, changing oil prices, or
other factors.
With our preferred ordering, we find shocks
to electrical and industrial prices to be the primary
sources of variance over the long run in their
pairings with wellhead prices. Our findings are
consistent with the long-run supply of gas at the
wellhead being fairly inelastic, and the long-run
demand for natural gas by industrial and electrical
users being fairly elastic.
Shocks to commercial and residential prices
are not the primary sources of variance in their pair-
ings with the city gate price. We do find, however,
that shocks to the city gate price are the primary
source of variance over the long run in its pairing
with the wellhead price. This finding suggests that
LDCs drive city gate and wellhead prices in the face
of fluctuating sales to end users and that the long-
run supply of gas at the wellhead is fairly inelastic.
Our evidence is consistent with administered
prices in the commercial and residential markets
for natural gas. As consumers lower (increase) their
consumption of natural gas, the LDCs pursue fewer
(greater) natural gas supplies at lower (higher)
prices. Only after the shock in the quantity of
natural gas demanded is transmitted to the city gate
price do commercial and residential prices for
natural gas adjust to changes in the city gate price.
Summary and Conclusion
Our econometric evidence indicates that
changes in natural gas prices are unequal in the
long run. Nonetheless, all downstream prices
change by at least as much as the average well-
head price. Statistically, residential and commer-
cial prices change as much as the city gate price.
In the face of persistent shocks, however, market
institutions and market dynamics can lead to
lengthy periods in which the residential and com-
Table 4
Long-Run Sources of Variance in Upstream and Downstream Prices
(Based on Choleski decomposition)
Sources of variance
∆PU first ∆PD first
Price Pairs ∆PU ∆PD ∆PU ∆PD
Upstream Downstream (Percent) (Percent)
Wellhead 50 50 3 97
Electrical 46 54 5 95
Wellhead 49 51 8 92
Industrial 47 53 5 95
Wellhead 27 73 25 75
City Gate 25 75 4 96
Wellhead 85 15 69 31
Commercial 79 21 62 38
Wellhead 76 24 78 22
Residential 66 34 67 33
City Gate 94 6 99 1
Commercial 92 8 94 6
City Gate 96 4 100 0
Residential 87 13 88 12Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 50
mercial prices of natural gas adjust less than the
wellhead or city gate prices.
Electrical and industrial users of natural gas
rely heavily on spot supplies and can switch fuels
easily. Their ability to switch fuels may be related
to the development of a spot market to serve
them. Reliance on the spot market may explain
why these end users have seen a greater reduc-
tion in natural gas prices than have the LDCs over
the past seven years. The ability to switch fuels
may account for electrical and industrial prices
being the source of shocks in their relationships
with the wellhead price. It also may explain why
prices in these end-use markets are quick to adjust.
Commercial and residential customers cannot
switch fuels easily and rely heavily on LDCs for
their natural gas. The inability of these end users
to switch fuels probably contributes to the reluc-
tance of LDCs to purchase spot supplies of gas.
Reliance on contract supplies may explain why
the city gate price has not declined as much as
electrical and industrial prices of natural gas over
the past seven years.
Furthermore, the LDCs administer prices in
the commercial and residential markets under
state regulation. The administration of prices in
these markets leads to slower adjustment in com-
mercial and residential prices. Only after city gate
prices can be reduced are commercial and residen-
tial prices for natural gas reduced.
Pipeline companies have been an integral
part of the uneven change in natural gas prices.
As natural gas prices have declined over the past
seven years, electrical, industrial, and city gate
prices have fallen more than the wellhead price,
while pipeline profitability has been reduced.
Our analysis suggests that the decline in pipeline
profitability is associated with reduced demand
for natural gas brought about by lower oil prices.
To summarize, public concern about recent
movements in natural gas prices, in which residen-
tial and commercial prices have fallen less than
wellhead prices, may be somewhat misplaced.
Although uneven changes in natural gas prices are
maintained in the long run, all downstream prices
change by at least as much as the wellhead price.
Uneven changes reflect differences in the end
users and the market institutions that serve them.
Our analysis indicates that if energy prices were
to rise, pipeline profitability would rise, and com-
mercial and residential end users would see smaller
increases in natural gas prices than electrical and
industrial end users. Compared with other natural
gas prices, commercial and residential prices
would be slow to rise.18
18 Data limitations prevent us from testing for asymmetric
relationships.Economic Review — Second Quarter 1993 51
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